Pure Coordination Game

A pure coordination game models participants with aligned interests who need to match choices but may have several possible coordinated outcomes. Shared goals do not automatically create shared expectations.

In a pure coordination model, participants share an interest in matching choices, yet may lack a shared expectation about which match to choose. Multiple coordinated equilibria can exist even without conflict over the desired match. Misalignment of expectations can therefore produce a poor outcome despite aligned interests.

A focal point is a feature that makes one choice salient to participants, but salience depends on shared context. Direct agreement can be more dependable when communication is available. Before using a coordination explanation, check whether people actually have different preferences, access constraints, or incentives; those require more than making one option obvious.

When to use it

When groups need to coordinate but lack explicit agreement on which action to take; when creating focal points would solve coordination problems; when understanding why aligned interests don't automatically produce coordinated action; when organizational strategy needs to function as a coordination mechanism.

How it can help

Check that the problem is primarily coordination, then use explicit agreement or a mutually salient convention. Verify that participants interpret the cue the same way and that no hidden preference or access conflict remains.