Ultimate Responsibility

Ultimate responsibility concerns a demanding form of moral responsibility that appears to require responsibility for the character from which one acts. Galen Strawson challenges that possibility; Dennett defends responsibility practices that do not require ultimate self-creation.

Ultimate responsibility asks whether an agent can deserve blame in a way that requires being responsible for the very character from which the action arose. Galen Strawson argues that self-creation of that kind cannot get started: any deliberate self-change already depends on prior motives and capacities. Randomness alone does not remove the problem.

Dennett defends forms of responsibility grounded in developed agency and social practices without requiring this ultimate origin. A practical discussion should distinguish that philosophical disagreement from questions about knowledge, control, coercion, repair, and fair treatment. The fact that a consequence changes behavior is insufficient by itself to justify imposing it.

When to use it

Use when causal explanations are treated as either eliminating all accountability or establishing that any behavior-changing consequence is justified.

How it can help

Distinguish metaphysical desert from concrete questions about agency, knowledge, control, accountability, and repair.